A closer look reveals how global forces helped support the Kurdistan Workers’ Party over the years… Abdullah Öcalan, whom Syria refused to hand over to Turkey, claiming he didn’t live there, was deported from the country after the decisive ultimatum of the Turkish Armed Forces. Thus, a phase came to an end in the struggle against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism that had lasted for almost 19 years. While Salman Zirqi, who was put in charge of Öcalan by Al Muhabarat, the Syrian Intelligence Service, helped him out of Syria to new destinations where he would find an equal amount of help and support, the chief terrorist was dreaming of new beginnings. This was understandable as PKK terrorism had cost Turkey tens of thousands of casualties and billions of dollars. It could easily be said that Syria, which was supported by the Soviet Union in the pre-1990 era; Greece, which is still hallucinating about revenging its defeat in Cyprus in 1974; Iran, which does not want a strong, democratic and secular Turkey in the region; and the post-1990 Armenia and the pre-1990 Bulgaria as well as prominent EU countries have extended their support in varying degrees to the PKK throughout the period in which this ruthless terrorist organization has sought power and recognition. Additionally, the United States, subsequent to the launch of the Combined Task Force — Poised Hammer, and finally Israel, within its search to somehow make a use for the Kurds following the second Gulf war, have provided some support to the PKK. At this point, it should be emphasized that alongside the United States, Russia, as another global power, has also supported and sheltered PKK terrorism at different times.
Soviet Union as global force and PKK:
The Syrian strategy of systematically supporting the PKK is undoubtedly in accordance with Syria’s historical national designs. Within the illusion of a Greater Syria, the acquisition of Hatay has always been a dream. To attain this goal, first Turkey was to be weakened, and to weaken Turkey they would trigger internal disruptions. Therefore, the harsh reality that the PKK terrorists received training in the camps in Syria and Lebanon and were transported from there to the Turkish border in the very vehicles of the Syrian Army and Al Muhabarat should be understood as an extension of this historical strategy of Syria. When Syria, whose military inventory always looks very impressive on paper, was pursuing such a strategy against Turkey, did it rely on its thousands of tanks, artillery and hundreds of warplanes or on the Arab world, which undeniably failed to support the Syrians during their wars against Israel? For the pre-1990 era the answer to this question should be “no.” Firstly, it was obvious that the Syrian Army would be no match against the much stronger and very well-disciplined Turkish Army, which was well equipped — according to NATO standards — to challenge the Soviet Army. Secondly, considering past events, Syria could not rely on the other Arab states, either. In this case, Syria could have relied only on powers other than the United States and NATO, which were evidently the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Syria expected that Turkish interference with Syria would have resulted in the harsh retaliation of the Soviet Union. In other words, the global and military force behind Syria, which was one of the two prominent patrons of the PKK (the other was evidently our neighbor Greece), was the Soviet Union.
The profit to be gained by the Soviet Union from the intensification of PKK terror and even the disintegration of Turkey was not to be underestimated. After all, a NATO member would have disintegrated and thus the Soviet Union would have easily been able to access the Mediterranean, the Middle East and, more importantly, the oil resources in the region. In fact, it should be remembered here that Bulgaria too played a certain role in the enhancement of the PKK’s terrorist power. Given that such involvement of Bulgaria in the issue was encouraged by the Soviet Union, the Soviet support provided to the PKK in the pre-1990 era became more visible. It is clear today that the Russian Federation, being the successor of the Soviet Union, has inherited Soviet methods of foreign policy and thus is continuing to handle the PKK similar to how the Soviets handled the group. This time, however, parallels have been drawn between PKK terrorism and the Chechen movement.
Focusing on the post-1990 era and elaborating on how Syria remained in support of the PKK until 1998, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we arrive at a critical point. Syria did not take into account the fact that it was not in a position to compete, militarily, economically or politically, with Turkey, especially having lost the empowering support of the Soviet Union with the collapse of this giant empire. Furthermore, Syrian military assets, which looked impressive on paper, had become outmoded and thrown on the scrap heap over the course of time.
On the matter of the PKK, one can not help but wonder about the answers to the following questions: If Syria was to be pacified easily, why then did Turkey very sadly lose thousands of sons and experience so much distress for years? Was it because of the insensitive and almost anti-national policies of the maladroit governments that ruled Turkey at the time? Were Turkey’s passiveness and indecisiveness a result of its miscalculation of the military and political powers backing PKK terrorism? Why did Turkey wait eight years until 1998? Why did not we force Greece, Armenia, the Greek Cypriot administration and Iran, alongside Syria, to answer for their support to the PKK? Was Turkey afraid that these states would form a Holy Alliance and conspire against Turkey? Or was there a concealed truth behind the global actors’ support of these states?
What caused our setback then? Was it the U.S. deployment of the “Combined Task Force — Poised Hammer” north of the 36th parallel in Iraq that began preparations for a Kurdish establishment in the region? Was it because, in a state of euphoria, we were completely mesmerized by our entry to the customs union? In reality, the situation was no different than the Ottoman signature on the Treaty of Baltalimanı in 1838, which is today accepted as the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. All these points must be examined historically. The first point to be elaborated upon is that the close relationship between the PKK and the Soviet Union was in the pre-1990, era when Soviet Russia was one of the two global powers. Unfortunately, contemporary Russia continued the same attitude towards the PKK for some time. Some significant proof of this is as follows:
Allegedly, there was a PKK-controlled training camp that was active for many years and which made possible the ideological education of the PKK’s mountaineering staff in Yaroslavl, lying 250 kilometers north of Moscow.
Materiel captured during Turkish military operations indicated that some of the weapons, including surface-to-air missiles (SAM), were Russian made.
The Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament, once attempted to recognize the PKK, which is something we still remember.
Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, went to Russia twice after leaving Syria, and his efforts to take refuge in Russia are also still in our minds.